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tNTRODUCTION
It is rather interesting to examine what a modern philosopher says about God who has

explicit~y

rejected st. Thomas's

God and has put forth a substitute which according to one
critic is more Godlike than that of St. Thomas. l In examin-

..

ing st. Thomas's explanation of God it is interesting to
notice that he explains his position in such a way as to meet
the objections brought out by Whitehead against his own view
and gives very definite reasons for excluding those concepts
which Whitehead wishes to use as descriptive of his own God.
The starting point of this thesis was a statement made by
Hartshorne.

In order to understand why he made it, it was

necessary to examine his analysis of St. Thomas's God,

and

next his analysis of Whitehead's God in order to see why he

.....

preferred the God of Whitehead to the God of St. Thomas.
Hartshorne's account of Whitehead's God is adequate for
the most part, and therefore instead of describing Whitehead's
God by direct quotations from Whitehead himself I have quoted
Hartshorne's summary of Whitehead's descriptions with references to the relevant passages in Whitehead.

However, at

times I brought in direct quotations from Whitehead where they
seemed important, and in particular I quoted Whitehead directly
1 Charles Hartshorne, "Whitehead's Idea of God,"
of Alfred North Whitehead, p. 523.

~

Philosophy

ii
in a few points which Hartshorne did not sufficiently
size.

The same

applie~

of st. Thomas's God.

~mpha

to the account which Hartshorne gives

This is simply a restatement of White-

head's own position on that point and therefore any direct
quotations from Whitehead as regards the God of st. Thomas
are

me~ely

for the sake of emphasis.

On examining st. Thomas's own concept of God in the light

.

of Hartshorne's difficulties and in contrast with the substitute account of God which Whitehead proposes, I was very
much interested to observe that in St. Thomas himself one
could find:

(a) a discussion of the very difficulties which

Whitehead raises against St. Thomas's God and

(b) explicit

reasons for rejecting the component elements of the substitute
concept which Whitehead offers.
Although I have reason to believe that this thesis is
It

acceptable in its present form, if time permitted I should
prefer for the purpose of publication to recast it along the
following lines:

first, to present point by point Whitehead's

comments on st. Thomas's God together with St. Thomas's
anticipations of those comments; and second, to present in
turn the various elements of Whitehead's concept of God in
contrast to the reasons which St. Thomas puts forward for

re-

jecting those same elements.
It is very difficult to give an analysis of Whitehead's
positive doctrines because of his esoteric terminology.

He

iii

.'

has created an entirely new philosophic vocabulary and has
the habit of using familiar words in novel senses.

To ferret

out the meaning he attaches to words is a study in itself.

PART I

CHAPTER
a~TSHORNE'S

.'

I

ANALYSIS OF ST. THOMASiS CONCEPT

In the first part of this chapter Professor Hartshorne's
"7

statement of Whitehead's views on St. Thomas are presented.

A

few points omitted by Hartshorne but relevant to our problem
are added towards the close of the chapter by the writer.
st. Thomas's God, as Whitehead conceives Him, is "sheer
absolute perfection."l

He is defined as completeness or

maximality of value, such that nothing conceivably could be
added to it.

u2

He is the flpure actuality," which contains

no potency whatsoever.

He is the IIcause of all,"

:l,n no aspect of its being the effect of any.,,3
"changeless," which is in no aspect changingj4
vhich is in no aspect dynamicj5

"which is
He is the

the "static,"

the independent, which is in .~

no aspect dependent,6 the one which is in no aspect many.

In

brief, He is the all-perfect, infinite, immutable, transcendent,
self-subsistent, "static Absolute."
As we shall see when examining St. Thomas's God, this
description is correct except in one point. 7

We must now

1 Charles Hartshorne, "Whitehead's Idea of God," in The Philos~ of Alfred North Whitehead, p. 518. See also A:-1f~ Whitehead, Modes of Thought, pp. 92-95.
; Hartshorne, .0'j)'7 cit., p. 516.
~ Ibid.
--~ Whitehead, Modes Jf Thought, p. 112
Ibid., p. Ill.
-~ A. N• Whitehead, Religion .1!L-~ Making, p .107 •
I' See below, pp. 17-18.

6

2

examine the analysis Professor Whitehead makes, of each of
these attributes and his reasons for rejecting them.

•

All of the attributes of the traditional God, it is Whiteheadls conviction, are arrived at by abstraction, a process
which is "nothing else than the omission of part of the truth,:8
The notion of complete or maximum perfection, for example, cannot be conceived except by abstracting from, or omitting from
consideration "all mutual exclusivenes'S among values,"
also "every aspect of process." 9

and

For it is evident that per-

fections of diverse types are discordant.

The perfection of

a Gothic Cathedral, for example, is not the perfection of a
nightingale.

Since, then, "there are possibilities of harmony

which produce evil in joint realization, or are incapable of
such conjunction," 10

there can be no "totality which is ,the
11
harmony of all perfections. tf
It is also evident that
God and the whole are constantly evolving, and perfections

It

which are incompatible in one set of circumstances may occur
together in a later stage of process. 12
Hence at no epoch
in the creative advance ma,y God be

It

absolute perfection."

Another reason advanced by Whitehead for rejecting the attributes of infinite perfection in God is that finite good could
not exist if there were any being which is the "infinitude of
8
9
10
11

Modes of Thought, p. 189.
Hartshorne, .2£. ill. p. 516.
Ibid., p. 520.
A:'"rf. Whitehead, Adventures of Ideas, p. 330. For a critical
analysis of this objection see below pP. 14-16.
12 Whitehead, Modes of Thought, p. 75. For a critical analysis
of this objection, see below pp. 34-39.

3
all perfection."

For to'affirm the existence of an intin1te

good external to and distinct from the world, and at the same
time, to affirm the existence of finite good, appears to him to
be a patent contradiction. 13
It is conceived by abstracting from consideration the interrelatedness of all things, 'including God.
A similar abstractedness, or one-sidedness of view, is
a.

involved in the Thomistic concept of God as the "immutable"
being and as flpure actuality."

Immutability omits activity.

It is the extreme notion of being as static in opposition to
being as dynamic.

Dynamic is the qualification" which has

been most sadly lacking in the tradition." 14
is one-sided for it omits potentiality.

"Pure actuality"

That it cannot be

ascribed to God is clear from the consideration that potentiality could not exist if there were any being who was "pure
15
actuality.tr
Also, since God has not produced all the effects He could produce, He contains potentiality. 16

.

The concept of God as wholly independent of the world, as
a "cause of all,"

"which is in no aspect of its being the

effect of any,fI is another idea arrived at by abstraction, or
Hartshorne, £2. cit., p. 534. St.Thomas's apticipation
of this objection-is quoted below p.16. His reply is given
below p.17.
14 Ibid., St.Thomas's anticipation of this objection is quoted
b'elow pp •. 17-18.
15 Ibid. p. 526. See Below p. 18 for our answer to this objection.
16 ~., p. 517. For a critical analysis of this objection
see below pp. 18-19.
13

4
omitting part of the truth.
cause and effect.

17

.'

Every actual entity is both

Further, there can be no cause without

an effect.

Again, "no God is conceivable who would not depend
for part of his value on the actions of creatures. fI Also, "the
doctrine of radical and complete independence of God from the
world represents an extreme position,"

the opposite of which

is the doctrine of "his complete identity with it.fI 18

...

extreme positions never represent the truth.

But

"There is no

entity, not even God's, which requires nothing but itself in
order to exist." 19
Such are Whitehead's reasons for rejecting the Thomistic
conception of God, as correctly restated by Hartshorne; and
such, apparently, are Hartshorne's own reasons for rejecting
it. A few additional objections which further elucidate Whitehead's position, but which are not explicitly mentioned by
Hartshorne follow.

....

Whitehead asserts that all of the attributes of the Thomistic God represent mere abstractions, similar to the idea,s in
Plato's realm of forms.

Thus Whitehead affirms:

The most simple doctrine about types of
being is that some extreme type exists
independently of the rest of things. For
example, Greek philosophers, and in particular, Plato, seem to have held this doctrine
17
18
19

Ibid., p. 517. See below pp.19-21 for st. Thomas's anticipation of this objection.
Ibid., p. 524.
Whitehead, Religion 19 the Making, p. 107. For a critical
analysis of this objection see below pp.21-27.

5
in respect of qualitative abstractions,
such as number, geometrical relations,
.'
moral characteristics, and the qualitative
disclosures of the higher sense perceptions •
• • • Later, it transformed the Hebraic
elements in Christian theology.
• • • This notion of the value of timeless
forms leads to rhetorical question-begging
phrases, such as 'self-s~staining,' 'com- 20
pletely real} 'perfection. '
The notions ,of immutability and self-subsistence, in Whitehead's view, were derived from· the
forms.

Gr~k

notion of mathematical

"Ee.ch number, each ratio, each geometric form exhibited

a static attainment ••.•

These ideal forms are motionless ••••

and self-sufficient."

Accordingly, ultimate reality was con-

ceived in the guise of a "static Absolute."

And "the static

Absolute has been passed over to philosophic theology, as a
primary presupposition." 21

Thomists, then)influenced by

the Greeks, have set up in the place of the concrete God, a
false abstraction.

In Whitehead's words, they have fallen into

the "Fallacy of Misplaced Concreteness" - "the error of mistaking the abstract for the concrete." 22
Another reason given by Whitehead for rejecting the traditional notion of God is that, in his view, it is based on an
erroneous science and an erroneous cosmology.

He asserts:

The phrase, "Prime Mover', warns us that
Aristotle's thought was enmeshed in the
20
21
22

Modes of Thought, pp. 92-94.
Ibid. ,~p. 111.
A. N. Whitehead, Science.~~ t!odern World, pp. 74-75.
For a critical analysis of this objection see below

pp. 27-29.

6
details of an erroneous physics and an
,
erroneous cosmology • • • • Today we repudiate
the Aristotelian physics and the Aristotelian
cosmology • • • • In the place of Aristotle's
God as Prime Mover,' we reggire God as the
Principle of Concretion. 23
The (in Whitehead's viewlerroneous theory of cosmology which
.;,

regards the laws of nature as imposed, is, according to him,
the basis of the traditional concept of God as First Cause.
[The theory which conceives \he laws
directing the universe as imposed]
requires a transcendent God as imposer • • •
God made his appearance in religion under .
the frigid title of First Cause, and was
appropria~~lY worshipped in white-washed
churches.
An erroneous theory of science, combined with Christian

theology, combined with ancient despotism, produced the classical concept of God, according to Whitehead.
The notion of God as 'unmoved mover' is
derived from Aristotle • • •• The notion
of God as 'eminently real' is a favorite
doctrine of Christian theology. The combination of the two into the doctrine of an aboriginal, eminently real, transcendent creator,
at whose fiat the world came into being, and
whose imposed will it obeys, is the fallacy
which has infused tragedy into the histories
of Christianity and of Mohametanism • • • ~he
Church gave unto God the attributes which
25
belonged exclusively to Caes8,r.
It is Whitehead's opinion that one must change his notion
of God with every important new scientific advance and every

23 1.!?l:.£., p. 250.
24 Adventures of Ideas, p. 154#
-.--25 Ibid.

7
notably new form of government.

nScience suggests a

c~~mology;

8nd whatever suggests a cosmology suggests a religion. 1f 26
tiThe great point to be kept in mind is that normally an advance in science will show that statements of v8,rious religious beliefs require some sort of mod~fication.tI 27

And relig-

ion should learn to "change face in the same spirit as does
science." 28

"In the origin of civilized religion,

like Dictators," we are told.

..

Gods are

tlWhen the religious thought

of the ancient world from Mesopotamia to Palestine and from
Palestine to Egypt, required terms to express that ultimate
unity of direction in the universe • • • • they could find no
better way to express themselves th8,n by borrowing the cha,racteristics of the touchy, vain, imperious tyrants who ruled the
empires of the world." 29

But "the old phraseology is at

variance with the psychology of modern civilizations. tI 30
Accordingly, it is Whitehead's belief, that a new

ide~l

of God

founded upon the new physics and upon the new democracies must
be given to twentieth-century mankind.

His substitute for

the Thomistic God will now be considered.
26
27

Religion.ULthe Making, p. 141.
Science .~. the _Modern . World, p. 257.

28

29

Ibid., p. 270.
Modes_~ Thought, p. 68.

30

Science . _-_.....o,..;;....-,.;;.;;;...;;.;.
and the Modern ___
World, p. 274 •
..-..;;;;~

·'

CHAPTER II
HARTSHORNE'S ANALYSIS OF WHITEHEAD'S CONCEPT

Whitehead I s God, as Professor H8,rtshorne very adequately
represents him, is the supreme exempliJ;ication of "ultimate contraries. tll He is both the permanent and the flux, the temporal
and the eternal, the "supreme cause" and the IIsupreme totality

..

of effects," the unity and the complexity, the activity and the
paSSivity, the being and the becoming, yes,he is even the joy
and the suffering, the good and the evil, and the creator and the
creature, though not in the same aspects of his being. 2
There are two natures in Whitehead's God,
and the Consequent.

the Primordial

In his Primordial Nature, God is " s tatic,tI

"eternal, f! ucomplete, perfect, infinite, II yet he is "unconscious,"'
and "deficient in actuality.fJ 3

The apparent inconsistency of
.

this assertion is, as Dr. Hartshorne assures us, only apparent,
~or

..

the completeness, perfection, and infinity ascribed to God

pelong only to "the dimension of 'mentality', or abstract realize:[IJion of value. II
~.bs'olute

"The unlimited conceptual

reali~ation

of the'

wealth of potentiality, as such realization of the poten

uial, is superior to any conceivable conceptual realization or
3.wareness of potency which could be distinguished from God's."
n the IIconcrete dimension of value ll God even in his Primordial
...

2

3

cit., p. 523.
Ibid.
A. N. Whitehead, Process ~ Reality, pp. 521, 523 ff.
See also Hartshorne, ££. cit., p. 525.

OQ.

9

.'

Nature, must not be understood to be infinite a,nd perfect. 4
God in his Consequent Nature, or concrete being, is conscious
and finite.

It is in this aspect that He is also "fluent,"

temporal, passive, a,nd dependent upon creatures. 5
God and the world are not separat.ed, for God is the "all
inclusive actual entity."

His being and the being of creatures

are so fused that any creature "if and when it exists, must be

...

fully contained in God, so that the two could not be distinguished except as the other failed to contain some value that was
contained in God.,,6

The only difference, then, which separates

God from creatures is one of value.

There is no ontological

separateness of one from the other. 7
This notion of God's relation to the world, according to
Professor Whitehead avoids two extremes:

first, the extreme

doctrine of "radical and complete independence of God from the
world,lI which is the position of traditional theism, and which

....

according to Whitehead is best exemplified in the rigid monotheism of the old Testament;8

and secondly, the opposite extreme

of Godls complete identity with the world, as equiva,lent to Pantheism.
God, therefore, is not purely transcendent, nor is He purely irn.manent. He is neither

II

mere creator," nor "mere total of

creatures." The phrase which properly expresses what He is, is:
Hartshorne, ££. cit., p. 526 (Italics not in the original).
5 For a critical analysis of this position see below pp.3l-32.
6 Ibid., p. 525.
7 For a critical analysis of this position see below pp.32-34.
8 Religion,la.~Making, p. 68.

4

the creator-with-the-creatures." 9

10
Or, since reality, accord-

ing to Professor Whitehead is to be viewed

8,S

.'

an organic unity,

like a person, we may conceive God as "the personality of the
cosmiC body," 10

"the harmony of epochR.l occasions, If or orga,nic

with the universe. ll

God becomes an abstraction
if separated
....

from the Universe, just [>,s the cells or molecules of a body
hBve no independent subsistence outside of the body.
God in one aspect of His being i~ evolving with the progressing world.

He is "enriched by the world," 12

e,nd He

(Ipasses be.ck to the world to sha.re this enhancement !13

As

Whi tehe2.d a,sserts:
The notion of a supreme being must apply
to an actuality in process of composition,
an actuality not confined to the data of
any special epoch in the historic field.
Its actuality is founded on the infinitude
of its conceptual appetition, and its form
of process is derived from the fusion of
this appetition with the data received from 14
the world-process.
And elsewhere:
It is as true to say that God creates the
World, as that the World creates God.
Admittedly, "the cause is never
ter always being the richer;

15

'equ8,1 to the effect,' the lat-

the former, seen retrospectively

9 Ibid., p. 517. See also Adventures of Ideas, pp. 154-166.
10 Ibid., p. 550
11 :AC:lVentures of Idee s, p. 264. ' For St. Thomas's reEtSOns for
rejecting such a position, see below p. 34.
12 Charles Hartshorne, "Is Whitehea,d' s God the God of Religion,"
in Ethics, Vol. LIII, No.3 (April 1943) p. 226.
13 Ibid.
Ih MO'des of Thought, p. 128.
15 .ProcesS-and Reality, p. p. 528. For St. Thomas's reasons for
rejecting such a pOSition, see below pp. 34-37.

11
being a reduction of the latter to an abstract or incomplete
version of itself.,,16

Moreover, "Neither God nor the World

reaches static completion.

Both are in the grip of...

creative advance into novelty.

the

Either of them, God and the

worldJis the instrument of novelty for;.the other." 17
Such are the more important aspects of Whitehead's God,

..

as Professor He,rtshorne describes them, and as an examination
of the relevant pe,s sage s in Whitehead's works referred to by
Hartshorne prove them to be.

We now pa.ss to Hartshorne's de-

fense of these attributes as more properly descriptive of the
supreme being than
16
17

~hose

ascribed to God by St. Thomas.

Hartshorne, ££. cit., p. 544.
Whitehead, Process.~,Reality, p. 529.

.'

CHAPTER III

HARTSHORNE'S COMPARISON OF THE TWO CONCEPTS AND
HIS REASONS FOR HIS CONCLUSION
.;,

We have seen why Professor Hartshorne rejects the Thomistic conception of God and what he accepts as a substitute for
it.

It now remains to be, seen why he

~hinks

this new notion

is better.
Whitehead's concept, it is Hartshorne

IS

conviction, repre-

sents a real, actually existing entity, -whereas the idea of
God given us by St. Thomas is an "abstract extreme ••••
ing the fallacy of misplaced concretness." 1

involv-

For:

Nothing-concrete or actual is merely one or
merely ~any, or a mere cause which is in no
way incomplete or subject to addition, or an
activity which is in no way passive.

2

Also, Whitehead's notion of God as "literally immanent"
in creatures, who "appropriates other individualities into himself," and who "requires his union with the world,1f 3 is better
than the Thomistic notion of God as transcendent, which denies
the social nature of God and absolutely denies that God is love~
The idea of a God who is, in some aspect of his being, "in
process" and -who is capable of "self enrichment" is more rationa
than the conception of an all-perfect God who is changeless. For
1

QQ. Cit., p. 521.

2

Ibid., p. 522.
Whitehead, Adventures of Ideas,p. 215.
Hartshorne,.£E. cit., -To 528.

3
4

13
to conceive the absolutely perfect it is necessary to

~stract

from, or omit from consideration, aspects essential to a.ny concrete entity, the temporal character of value, •

..

as all mutual exclusiveness among values, • • •

and all rela-

tionship to beings whose value is not terfect." 5

as well

The content

of the concept of perfection, then, varies with the cosmic advance, and its concrete realization is limited by the setting
proyided by its cosmic epoch.
5.

Ibid., p. 516.

•

.'

PART II
CHAPTER I
CRITICAL EXAMINATION OF HARTSHORNE'S ANALYSIS
OF ST. THOMAS'S

CO~CEPT
~

In Hartshorne's criticism of traditional theism all of
the attributes ascribed to God by St. Thomas are made to appear

..

as "abstract or one-sided" ideas,l conceived by omitting from
consideration "one pole of a categorical contrast," 2

and

representative, consequently, of only part-truths. The two attributes of "sheer absolute perfection and sheer c8,usality or
actuality" are singled out as especially exemplificative of this
error. 3
The notion of infinite perfection is held to be incapable
of concrete realization on the ground that perfections are
diverse and obviously mutually repugnant. IIPossibilities are in
part mutually incompatible, they are not a,lways compos sible , and
as Whitehead says, theologians have been strangely reluctant to
face the implications of this truth." 4
But is St. Thomas committed to the view that God is tithe
infinitude of all perfections," in the sense that in Him oppositE
perfections coexist?

On the contrary, he is careful to ma,ke

clear that he does not teach any such absurdity.

He himself pro-

poses this very objection before proceeding to show in yhatway
1
2

Q£. cit. p. 517.
~. p.

516.

3

4

Ibid.
Ibid., p. 526.

15
all the perfeytions of crea,tures are contained in God.
he asserts:

.'

Thus,

Opposites cannot coexist. Now perfections
of things are opposed to each other, for
each thing is perfected by its specific difference. But the differences by which genera
are divided, and species constituted, e. re
opposed to each other. Th~efore, because
opposites cannot coexist in the same subject,
it seems that the perfections of all things 5
are not in God.
However, God is spoken of as

universal~y

perfect, St. Thomas ex-

plains, "bec8llse
He lacks not • • • any excellence that may
be found in any genus. This may be seen
from two considerations. First, because whatever perfection exists in an effect must be
found in the effective cause; either in the
same formality, if it is an univocal agent, as
when man produces man; or in a more eminent
degree, if it is an equivocal agent •
• • • NOW, it is plain that the effect preexists virtually in the efficient cause; and
though to exist in the potentiality of a
ma~erial cause is to exist in a more imperfect way, since matter as such is imperfect,
and an agent as such is perfect, still to preexist virtually in the efficient cause is ,to
pre-exist, not in a more imperfect, but in a
more perfect, way. Since, therefore, God is
the first effective cause of things, the perfections of all things must pre-exist in God 6
in a more eminent ,way.
St. Thomas, then, in affirming that all the perfections of
creatures are contained in God does not thereby assert that opposites coexist in the
~ithout

s~e

subject, -this could not be done

palpable contradiction, --

but that God, as cause, pos-

sesses at least equivalently all the perfections of His effects.

5
6

St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica I q.4 . e..'2. obj.2.
Ibid., Resp.

16

.'

Certain rules of prediaation are given us by the Angelic
Doctor which assist us in understanding how the various perfections of created things are to be ascribed to God.

Thus, he

observes, some perfections of their very nature imply imperfection.

Among these are all

perfections~which

imply corporeal

conditions, such as physical beauty, sight, hearing, and extension.

St. Thomas a.sserts that these are to be predicated of

God only metaphorically.

Other perfections, such ~s goodness,

life, intelligence and the like, on the contrary, do not of thenr'
selves involve imperfection, and so are predicated of God literally.

However, since these latter perfections are found in

creatures only in a limited and finite manner, they are not attributed to God according to the mode in which the creatures
possess them, but in a. supereminent way. 7 By observing St.
Thomas's rules of predication, then, it is possible to attribute
to God infinite perfection without contradiction.
We have now to examine the objection that finite perfection
could not exist if there were any being which was infinite perfection.

This objection, like the preceding, must not be sup-

posed to be new.

St. Thomas was fully aware of it.

His state-

ment of it runs:
• • • that which is a thing in such a way as not
to be another thing, is finite according to substance. But God is this and not another; for He
is not a stone or wood. Therefore, God is not
8
infinite in substance.
This difficulty is based on the fallacy of regarding the

7 Ibid. I q. 13 a 3 ad 1; I q. 13 a 6.
8 'I'6'IQ:. I q. 7 a 1 obj. 3.

17
term 'being' as univocal.

.'

Professor Hartshorne assumes that

God and man are beings in the same sense.

Yet the word 'being'

is analogous even in its reference to created things. Thus its
meaning is not identical when it is applied to substance and to
accident, or to a thinker 'and his

tho~ht.

Consequently, the

existence of an infinite Being who is the fullness of all reality, in no way precludes the existence of finite beings.

In

other words, God plus creatures does ntt constitute more being;
they simply cannot be added, for creatures are beings in an inferior order.

After creation, there are more beings, but

there is no more being in the world.

A feeble comparison may be

made regarding knowledge which is first possessed only by a
teacher and later by all his pupils.

After the instruction

there would be more people who would know, but there would be no
more knowledge.

Or to use St. Thomas's comparison:

The created good is related to the uncreated
good as a pOint to a line, since there is no
proportion between one and the other; whence
as a point added to a line does not make it
greater, so neither does a created good • • •
added to the uncreated good make it greater.

9

This brings us to the objection that an immutable God is
"static, inactive, or dead."

This is a false equation. St.Thomas

never identified an immutable God with a static God.

On the con-

tra.ry, he proves that the immobility to be ascribed to an allperfect God is not the immutability of inertness or lifelessness,
but the immutability of supreme activity.
9

In ill Sent. d. 1 q. 2 a. 3 ad 1.

Indeed, anticipating

18
this very objection he asserts:

.'

It seems that life is not properly attributed
to God. For things are said to live inasmuch as
they move themselves. • • • But movement does
not belong to God. Neither, therefore, does life. 9
He then points out that activity is not identical with movement
or change, but that the more perfect tte activity the less is
the movement.

Thus immanent activity involves less change than

transitive activity.

Further, the

hi~hest

kind of immanent

activity is intellection, and this operation in God involves no
movement.

Consequently, God though immutable is supremely ac-

tive and living.
Professor Hartshorne's difficulties regarding "sheer causality or actuality" must now be examined.
conception of God as

His rejection of the

pure actualityfl on the ground that, "poten10
tiality • • • could be nothing, were there a complete actuallty,"
It

is the result of his simple and univocal conception of the
of being.

not~IJ

As we have already shown, this notion is analogous

and consequently, the existence of real potentiality in the order
of created things does not preclude the existence in a divine
mode of a Being, Who is Pure Act.
But, it is urged, potentiality must exist even in the divine
mode of being, since God has not produced all of the effects He
could produce.

St. Thomas offers a full solution of this diffi11
culty in his Contra Gentiles,
which we venture to restate

9

10
11

Summa Theologica, I q. 18 a. 3 obj. 1.
Ope Cit., p. 526.
Contra Gentiles,II c.XXXIII and XXXV; also de' Pot.,q.3 a 17.

--
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briefly.

"It is impossible for a new action to be in the agent,
4'

unless the latter be in some way moved, at least from inaction
to action."

But newness of ef'fect does not necessarily prove

newness of action, nor consequently change in the agent.
the case of an agent whose will is

ab~olutely

For in

efficacious for

producing its effect, the appearance of the latter need not
necessarily coincide in time with the act of willing it.

But

the will can appoint the time a.s well 1s other conditions of the
thing. ,Therefore an effect may follow anew from an agent's former will, without any new action on his part. In God, then,

the~

is no transition from potency to act because effects emerge in
time.

He has willed from all eternity the moment in time at

which they should appear.
Let us now pass to the objections directed against the
notion of God as transcendent. "An agent which acts, but is not
12
acted upon, II
a God who is t cause of all,' but effect of none
is regarded by Professor Hartshorne as an absurdity. In his
metaphysics, creatures "furnish parts of" God. 13 But as
St.Thomas teaches:
• • • God is outside the order of the whole
creation, nor does any relation to the
creature arise from His nature; for He does
not produce the creature by necessity of His
nature, but by His intellect and will • • • •
Therefore there is no real relation in God
to the creature, whereas in creatures there
is a real relation to God • • • because their
very nature entails dependence on God.

1---------------£!!.,

12

~.

13
14

Ibid., p. 541.
~a Theologica I q.28 a.1 ad 3.

p. 516.

14

20

,That the condition of God as Creator does not .involve in
Him a relation to, and consequently dependence upon the created
universe, is shown by St. Thomas 15 from the following considerations.

Relations are either real or conceptual in three

ways, since every relation has' two ext.remes.
They are real in
....
both'extremes "When a habitude exists between two things according to some reality which belongs to both," as hp',ppens in
relations of quantity, such s,s between·double and hs,lf, large
and small, and the like.

They are conceptual in both extremes

when the "habitude can only be between things in the apprehensi,on of reason. tI

Thus the relation existing between an idea

and a word signifying it, is a conceptual relation, since there
is no objective connection between the idea and the. word, but
only a connection established by the mind.
Finally, a relation may be real in one extreme and concep.....
tual in the other. This happens whenever. the two extremes are
not of the same order; as objects in nature and concepts representing them belong to the real and the conceptual orders
respecti vely.

Between s, concept and the object which it repre-

sents there is a real relation on the side of the concept, for
the latter could not have originated without the former.

But

the object is in no sense really dependent upon the concept.
It is not affected in any way by ideas representing it.
stone does not grow larger because many think of it.)

(A
There is

merely a conceptual or mental relation between it and a concept
15

Ibid., I q. 13 a.7.

representing it.
the universe.

21
The relation is the same as regards God and

As St. Thomas concludes:

.'

Since therefore God is outside the whole
order of creation, and all creatures are
ordered to Him, and not conversely, it is
manifest that creatures are really related
to God Himse·lf; whereas in God there is no
real relation to creatures, but a relation
only in idea, inasmuch as creatures a,re
ref'erred to Him.
God, then"is necessary to the world, but, and here we

..

must disagree with Professor Hartshorne, the world is not
necess8,ry to God.

The ef'fect cannot exist without its cause,

but the converse is not true.

As st. Thoma.s puts it:

If one thing is the cause of another
thing, the cause can exist without the
thing caused, but not vice versa.

17

We come now to the objection that the Thomistic notion
of complete transcendence represents a,n extreme, the opposite
of which is the notion of complete identity between God and
the world.

We must note, first of all, that the traditional ....

idea of transcendent God is vastly different from Whitehead's notion of it, which Hartshorne apparently adopts.
Whitehead equates a transcendent God with a "touchy, vain,
imperious tyrant" of the Mesopotamian and Egyptian variety.
He is "frigid," unconcerned as to the workings of the world
or to the suf'ferings of man.

Moreover, Whitehead informs us:

The concept of him was a sublimation from
its barba,ric origin. He stood in the same
rela,tion to the whole World as early
Egyptian or Mesopotamian kings stood to
their subject popUlations.
18
--=-16,......-=I::":"b~i~d-.- 17 De Ente et Essentia, c. 4.
18 Adventures of Ideas,p. 216.
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Whitehead frequently speaks of the notions of "complete reali ty, II "absolute being,"

tf

self- sustaining reality, If ant the

like, as haunting human imagination. 20

We do not wonder.

For

the myth to ,whom Whitehead ascribes these attributes is but
the ghost of the living God.

It is the god of the Deists, --

whom to most Christians are but Atheists in disguise, -

not

the Supreme Being of the traditional theists.
The God of Thomistic philosophy,. though "above all things
by the excellence of His nature," is not on that account distant from 8.nd unconcerned about them. 2l

On the contrary, He

is very near, for He "is in all things, and innermostly,"
"not, indeed as part of their essence, nor as an accident,
but as e,n agent is present to th9.t upon which it works." 22
So intimately is the world related to God that were He to
withdraw His sustaining influence from it for one moment, it
would relapse into nothingness, just as the light which is
caused.in,the air by the sun disappears at once when the sun
ceases to enlighten it. 23
To those who find it difficult to conceive why the world
once created could not continue in being without God, just as
a house once constructed continues without the builder, St.
Thomas offers the following considerations:
Every agent depends upon its cause, so far as
it is its cause. But we must observe that an
20
21
22
23

Cf. Modes of Thought, p. 94.
Summa .Theologica, I q. 8 a. 1.
~.

Ibid., I q. 104, a. 1.

23

agent m8,y be the cause of the becoming of
its effect, but not directly of its being.,
This may be seen both in artificirl 2nd i;
natural things: for the briilder causes the
house in its becoming, but he is not the
24
direct c-ause of it s being.

The being of the house, St. Thomp.s explains, depends UDon the
building materials, - the "cement, sioone, gnd WOOd," -just
as its becoming depends upon the e,ction of the builder.

And

just as the becoming of an effect ceases upon the cessation

..

of the operat'ion of the agent which is the cause of its becoming; so likewise, the being of a thing 81so cea,ses upon the
cessation of the a,ction of the agent which is the cause of
its being.

Consequently, if all of the cosmic influences

necessary for the conservation of the house were to wi thdra,w
their causality, the structure would at once disappear.
The truth that no being continues in existence ivithout
the present actu2,1 existence of its cause in being is more
evident in the ca,se of animal existence.

For it is obvious

that the continuance in being of even a gnat depends upon such
cosmic influences as sole.r heat, atmospheric pressure, food,
and the like, without which it would at once perish.

Though

it is less evident at first, it becomes clear upon a little
consideration that no created being can continue in existence
without the present actual existence of God.

Accordingly, st.

Thomas concludes, "every cree,ture maybe compared to God as the
air is to the sun which enlightens it. fI

24

Ibid.

For as "the ,cdr does

24
not continue to be lit up, even for a moment, when the sun
ceases to act upon it, II so the creature "would at once·'cease
and all nature would collapse," if the causal power of God
were to be withdrawn. 25

Since then "God not only gave

existence to things when they first began to exist, but also
.;,

causes existence in them as long

8,S

they exist," 26

8,nd,

since by His sustaining Power, He conserves them in being at
every moment lest they lapse back inti the nothingness from
which they came, He can scarcely be said to be unconcerned
as to the workings of the world.
Is God, however, a "frigid" being, a "tyrant" with whom
creation is "an inferior avocation," as Whitehead asserts?
A brief consideration of the reason why the world came into
being should preserve one from entertaining any such faulty
notion.

God did not create the universe in order to add to

His perfection, or to increase His happiness.
fullness of being, of perfection, of happiness.

He is the
He is in no

way greater or happier for having brought the world into
existence.

God has given being to creatures out of pure

benevolence, - that others might share the good which He possesses.

Unlike creatures
He does not act on account of His goodness
as if He were seeking to acquire goodness
which He did not possess; but rather as
seeking to communicate what He already possessed. Because God acts, not out of desire
of the end, but out of love of it.
27

---------------25 Ibid.
26
27

contrA Gentiles, III p. 67.
De Potentia" q. 3 a. 15 ad 14 um.

~

25
Emphasizing the truth that it is not for utility that God has
created, St. Thomas also states:
It does not belong to the First Agent . • •
to act for the acquisition of some end, He
intends only to communiQate His perfection,
which is His goodness.2~ Therefore, He
alone is the most perfectly liberal giver,
because He does not act for His own profit,
but only for His goodness.
29
St. Thoma.s explains that just as natural things have a
natural inclination to diffuse their tood among others, - the
plant to diffuse itself in a flower, the animal to diffuse
itself in its kind, -

so, much more does it befit the Divine

Goodness from Whom all perfection is derived, to communicate
His Good to others.

He states:

• • • natural things have a na,tur8.1 inclination not only towards their own proper good,
to acquire it if not possessed, and, if possessed, to rest therein; but also to spread
abroad their own good amongst others, so far
as possible. Hence we see that every agent,
insofar as it is perfect and in act, produces
its like. It pertains, therefore, to the
nature of the will to communicate as far as
possible to others the good possessed; and
especially does this pertain to the divine'
will, from which all perfection is derived in
some kind of likeness. Hence, if natural
things insofar as they are perfect, communicate their good to others, much more does it
B_ppertain to the divine will to communica,te
by likeness its own good to others, Ets·much
as i~ possible.
30
God, then, crea,ted beings, not because He had any need of them,
nor because He could derive any utility from them, but solely
28 Summa Theolo~ice, I q. 44.a.4.
29 Ibid., I q. 4.a.4 .. ad 1 un.
30 Ibid., I q. 19.a.2.

to communicate His Goodness.
Such divine altruism is incredible to Professor Hartshorne who is of the opinion that:
Only a mere machine that blindly passed
out benefits could conform to the notion
of benevolence that hpd nothing to ga,in
from its service to others7
31
There is another thought which· carries with it the refutation of the false notion that a transcendent God "stood in

...

the same rela.tion to the whole Wor,ld a,s ea.rly Egyptian or
Mesopotamian kings stood to their subject pOpula,tions. tI

It

is that God transcendent and perfect loves all creatures with
an eternal love.

Although creatures have not existed from

eternity, except in God, yet because they have been in Him
from eternity, God has known them eternally in their proper
natures; and for that reason has loved them. 32
God does not love as we love.
lovable, -

Moreover,

We love beings because they B.re
....

their goodness arouses love in us.

But God does

not love creatures because they are lovable; they are lovable
because He loves them.
God loves everything tha,t exists. Yet not
as we love. Because since our will is not
the cause of the goodness of things, but is
moved by it as by its object, our love,
whereby we will good to anything, is not the
cause of its goodness; but conversely, its
goodness, whether real or imaginW'y, calls
33
forth our love.
~-------------31 Charles Hart shorne, "Is WIli tehea.d I s God the God of
Religion," Ethics, Vol. LIII No.3 (1934) p. 225.
32 st. Thoma,s Aquinas, Summa Theologica, I q. 20 a. 2.
33 Ibid., I q.20 a.2 2,d 2.

27

.'

A complete enalysis of A.ll the titles by which the
.

world and God 2re intima,tely related in Thomistic philosophy
would carry us far beyond the scope of this paper.

However,

the thoughts we heve sketched: that God loved the world from
all eternity, that because of His loXe of. it He brought it
into being, and that He conserves it in being at every moment
lest it fall back into nothingness, -

1'3.11 prove that the God

of St. Thoma.s is not the extreme whict. lies opposl te to the
position which regards God as completely identified with the
world.

On the contrary; it is the virtuous meEtn which lies

between the two extremes of Pantheism and De.ism.
So much foI' Whitehead's objections a.gainst the tra,ditiona1
conception of God as rests,ted by Hp.rtshorne.

Two further ab-

jections raised by WhiteheAd, but nat explicitly mentioned
(

by HaI'tsharne, must nat be cansidered: first that the attributes of the Christian Gad repI'esent mere abstr.!:'ctians simi-

....

lar to. the abstI'actians in PIRto's realm af forms; and
secondly, that they are based upan an erraneaus theary af
science and cansequently must be Abandaned.
As . regards the first ob jection, Whitehead, as we ha,ve
seen" canfuses abstractian with omission ar absence.

He views

the notions of self-subsistent being, immutable being, infini te being, transcendent being, a,nd the like, as mere abstrp.ctians" because of such pre-suppasi tians .g,S:
There i's no. entity, not even God, "which requires
34
nothing but itself in order to exist."
34 Religion in the Ma.kiI,!g, p. 107.
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No actuality is a static fact • . •
"existence in g,ny of its forms
cannot be abstra,cted from process." 35

.'

All realization is finite. 36
No entity can be considered in
abstraction from the Universe. 37
But all of these assumptions 8,re erroneous as we shall show
in the next chapter.
Tha,t it is a mistake to attribut4e to St. Thomas the
Platonic position is clear from the consideration that Plato's
"universals," -

"Beauty, If the "Good, II and the like, -

essences, they are not existences.
higher tha,n existence.

are

Essence, with Plato, is

But unless there be something whose

essence is its existence, essence can be understood without
anything being known of its existence.

Hence Plato's Ideas

of the Good, Beauty, and the One may not exist in the n8,tural
order.

St. Thome,s' s Good, "Pure Act, ft however, is an Exis- ....

tence, "He is a Pure Act of Existing. 1I 38

That St. Thomas's

conclusions about God really apply to 8,n actual entity is
obvious once the value of the idea is properly understood.
The idea revea,ls directly reality, and only indirectly the
mental representetion of it.

Its purpose is primarily to ma,ke

known the object, and only secondarily to be known itself.
is the means

N

It

which the intellect knows, and not that which

it knows. "The stone is that which is understood [i.e. known]
35 Adventures of Idees, p. 354.
36 Ibid., p. 330.
37 Mathematics and the Good, p. 672
38 E. Gilson, God 8,nd PhilosophX.
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and not the likeness (i.e. the idea] of the stone; except by

.'

a reflection of the intellect on itself:

otherwise the ob-

ject s of science [i. e. knowledge] ,,,ould not be things, but
only intelligible species [i.e. ideas] " 39
Ideas, then, have a reol vl?_lue bectmse
they make known
..,
things.

In like menner judgments which are composed of ideFl.s,

are judgments of reAlity.

Further, ree,soning which is me.de

up of judgments, drmTs conclusions p,btut reAlity.

When the

mathematicie.n ree,sons a.bout quantity, his conclusions gpply
to quantity in the ree.l order.

1fuen a physicist ree.sons about

motion, his conclusions B.pply to motion

When

8.

philosopher reasons about God, his conclusions apply to

8,

~tS

it is.

real

Being, and not to a mere subjective idea or abstraction
(unless, his judgments are fe,lse or his reasoning processes
8,re incorrect).
.....

This brings us to the final objection that the traditional
theistic arguments are based upon ancient and medieval science
and consequently must be abandoned.

Contrary to Whitehead's

assumption, Thomistic theodicy is not built upon any system of
natural science.

Indeed, st. Thomas teaches the,t it is an

error to apply the principles and methods of a lower science
to a higher science.

liThe principles of mathematics," he de-

clares, by way of example, "are applicable to physics, but the
converse is not true, for physics depends upon mathematics,
39

St. Thomas

.~.quinas,

Summe. Theologica, I q.76 a.2 ad 4.

30
but not vice versa." 40

Now philosophy, which is

th~.

science

which studies being, not under any particular aspect, but
being as being, is above all other sciences and, therefore,
wholly independent of them.

Consequently, just as it is

ridiculous to suppo"se that the multiplication table must be
altered with each new advance in physics, so it is equally
absurd to believe that our concept of God must be recast with

..

every new advance in mathematics, or physics, or biology.
the contrary, it is Whitehead's concept which is admittedly
grounded upon the new science that will pass away when the
present theories become antiquated.
40

De Trinitate Boetii, q. 5 a. 3 ad 5.

On

CHAPTER II
CRITICAL EXAMINATION OF HARTSHORNE'S ANALYSIS
OF WHITEHEAD'S CONCEPT

..., . .
Professor Hertshorne's plain descrlptlon of Whitehead's
God is, 'as ·we have seen, 1

substantially correct.

The valid-

ity of his conclusion that this God is a real God must now

...

be examined.
According to the Chicago professor "the entire complexity
of ultimate contraries" 2

must be applied to God.

Let us

consider the most fundamental of these sets of opposites and
see if it is reasonable to apply them to the Supreme Being.
Thus, let us examine if:
lilt is as true to say that God creates the
World, as that the World creates God. 1t
And if:
"It is e,s true to say that God is permanent
and the World fluent, as that the World is 3
permanent and God is fluent."
As regards the first contention, Dr. Hartshorne, like
Whitehead, is convined that, "No God is conceivable who would
not depend for part of his value upon the a.ction of creatures." 4

And when we investigate concerning what "part of

his value" it is for which a God is thus dependent we find
it is a very importl:mt part indeed.

For it is in his "concrete

1 See above, Part I, Ch. II.
2 Ope cit., p. 523.
3 'Ibid., p. 522; also Whitehead, Process and Reality p. 528.
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degree," the.t is, in his real, a.ctual being, that he
upon them.

~epends

"All reF"lization is social," we are told, " and

in its concrete degree dependent upon other being. "5

In

Dr. Hartshorne1s view, God apart from the universe possesses
only "conceptual" or "abstre.ct re,~lli~ation of value," a.s
opposed to real or IIconcrete dimension of value." 6

..

But if this is so, then God apart from the universe possesses no real being.

For to maintain on this supposition,

that God apart from the universe is anything real, it would
be necessary to identify the conceptual with the real.
these two orders are totally distinct -

But

one belongs to the

order of objective existence, the other to the order of
thought.

To identify them is to identify the diverse.

But

if God possesses no ree.l being apart from the universe he is
not God but the universe.
However, Dr. Hartshorne protests that the God of Whitehea
is not completely identified with the world.
of Pantheism.

He is not the Go

Nevertheless, if God is "the synthesis of the

total universe," if he 1s lithe all-inclusive actual entity,"
if creatures "furnish parts of God," if the only difference
which separates God and creatures is one of IIvalue ," if there
is no ontologica.l separateness between the one and the other,
then there is no reason for God being distinct from the world.
But to make God and the world ontologically one, is to
5

6

Whitehead, Adventures of Ideas,p. 215.
See above, pp. 8-9.
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.'

make the mover identica.l with the moving thing, under the
same formal relation, and to make the simple identical with
the composite, the necessary with the contingent, the cause
with the effect, in a word, it is to deny the first principles
of reason.
St. Thomas's God, in contrAst with this, is "outside the
order of the whole creation."
from all created things.
tinct from existence,
are identical.

For He is different in nature

..

In crea.tures essence is always dis-

where~s

in God essence and existence

For:

Existence is that which makes every form or
nature actual; for goodness or humanity is
only spoken of a,s actual when it is spoken of
as existing. It is necessecry, therefore, that
existence should stand to essence, which is
distinct from it, in the same relation a,s
actus,li ty to potentiality. Therefore, since
in God there is no potentiality,. it follows
ths,t in Him essence does not differ from
existence. Therefore His essence is His
existence.
7
God, then, is His being, His goodness, His perfections, whereas creatures merely have their being, their perfections.

God

is being itself, creatures are beings merely by participation.
Moreover, all the being and goodness which creatures possess
they hold from God, Who called them forth from nothingness.
Without Him they would have only
no identification of the diverse.

non-bei~g.

Now there can be

Since the being of God a,nd

the being of creatures belong to wholly different orders,

7 St. Thomas AqUinas, Summa Theologica, I q. 3

8..

4.

quoted in Scholastic Metaphysics II, by J.F.McCormick,p.100.
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creatures ca.nnot "furnish parts of God," or fuse with Him or
be I?dded to or subtracted from Him.

.'

The difficulty of con-

ceiving how creatures can be derived from God without forming
pa,rt of Him arises from the failure, alrel?dy mentioned,8

to

conceive "being" as analogous.
St. Thomas also proves negatively that God is distinct
fr om the world.

.(';"s if wri t ing f or our own time s, he asks,'

"Whether God enters

into the composition of other things?"

He then proves that it is impossible for God to be united to
the universe either as the soul of the world,

p,s

the formal

principle of things, or as the material principle of things.
For God is the first efficient Cause, a.nd the efficient cause
cannot be identical either with the form or with the matter of
its effect.

It "is not identical numerically with the form of

the thing caused, but only specifically;1t and it is neither
numerically nor specifically identical with the matter of the'"
thing caused. 9

Consequently, just as a statue c.a,n never be

identical with the scupltor, pgrticipated being can never be
identical with neces$ary being.

To view God as "the personal-

ity of the cosmic body," as the "mind" or soul of the universe,
is to conceive God as both maker and made -

A.S

the essential

pa,rt of a compound which He Himself has created, -

which is ,

absurd.
This brings us to the second contention: that God is "in
proce~s" with the evolving world.

8 See above pp. 16-17.
9 Summa Theolo ica, I q. 3 a. 8.

"All realization," 've are
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told, "involves implication in the creative advance." 10

•

"A process is inherent in God's nature whereby His infinity
is acquiring realization." 11

But God cannot be "in process"

nor implicated in "the creative advance."

For, as St. Thomas

proves, flWhatever is in movement is moved by another."

Move-

ment or "process" is necessarily a transition from potency
to act.

(By potency is meant passive capability.

It is "the

...

principle through which anything is capa,ble of being moved or
. acted upon by another. n12

Act is the realization of

potenc~)1

But:
Nothing can be moved from potentiality to
actuality, except by some being already in
a state of actuality. But it is not possible
that the same thing should be at once actual
and potential in the same respect, but only
in different respects. For what is actually
hot cannot simultaneously be potentially hot;
but it is simultaneously potentially cold.
It is therefore impossible that in the same
respect and in the same way a thing should
be both mover and moved, i.e., that it should
move itself. Therefore, whatever is in motion
must be put in motion by another. If that by
which it is put in motion be itself put in
motion, then this also must needs be put in
motion by another, and that by another again.
But this ca,nnot go on to infinity, because
then there would be no first mover, and, consequently no other mover;seeing that the subsequent movers move only inasmuch as they a.re
put in motion by the first mover; as the staff
moves only because it is put in motion by the
hand. Therefore it is necessary to arrive at
a first mover, put in motion by no other, and
this everyone understands to be God.
13
10

11

12

13

Whitehead, Modes of Thought, p. 200.
Ibid., Adventures of Ideas, p. 356.
Comm. Met. V., Lect. 14.
Summa Theologica, I q. 2 a,.3.

.
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If a thing, then, has not a particular form of being, it
4'

cannot be the source from which it receives the process by
which it attains that new form.

"No one can give (either to

himself or another) what he does not possess."

Now a con-

tinuous IIprocess" involves a continuous transition from
.."7

potency to act, -- a continuous production of a new effect.
But the sufficient reason of the new effect can only be the
continuous operation of a.,n efficient

~ause.

The sufficient

reason of IIprocess ll can only be a being in act.

Otherwise

we should have to say that being comes from nothingness, the
gree,ter comes from the less, what has not being has being,
which is absurd.
We note that this absurdity is not beyond the credulity
of contemporary philosophers.

Professor Hartshorne

cle8~rly

asserts, lithe cause is never 'equal to the effect,' the latter
always being the richer; the former, seen retrospectively,
being a reduction to an abstract or incomplete version of
itself.1f
Whitehead's God, then, who is Ifin process, II demands e,
mover.

To say that he derives his added perfections from

creatures does not'help the situation.
tures derive them?

For whence do crea-

According to this metaphysics, creatures

derivet.hem from God and God derives them from creatures.
IfNei ther God nor the World reaches stl1,tic completion.

Both

are in the grip • • • of the cree.,ti ve advance into novelty.
Either of them, God and the World, is the instrument of

•

,novelty for the other." 15

.
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"God is enriched by the world" • .
'

he passes back to the world to share this enhancement."
pers need be penniless no longer on this re8soning.

Ppu-

Let them

merely get together and enrich each other.
Professor Whitehead's attempt tq.... eV8de this difficulty
by supposing that God is acted upon, or moved in one aspect,
but in a different aspect of his being, he is the agent, is
untenable.

For there can be no vicio.s circle in the same

order of caus8.1i ty.

Otherwise the cause would and would not

presuppose its effect.

If the light in the air depends upon

the transmission of light from the sun, sol,g,r light cannot
depend. upon light in the air.

If knowledge in the pupil de-

pends upon the teacher, the pupil is not the efficient cause
of this knowledge in the teacher. 16
In contrast with this theory of a "fluent'" God, who grows,
improves cmd enriches himself, and who, therefore, necessaril.:
presupposes an f.'ctuality superior to himself who IlctU8.l1y
possesses the improvement gnd enrichment for which this one
is as yet only in potency, is the Thomistic doctrine of an
uncha,ngeable, infinitely perfect actuality, "Pure Act, II
Who IS,"

flSubsistent Being,"

"He

lithe plenitude of all perfection

of all being, tI and the 8dequate source of ,nIl becoming or
"nrocess" in the universe .
.I:

We have already seen thA,t the world requires a pl'>ime mover
(pp. 35-3 6 ); the,t the prime mover must be "Pure Act" is clear
15 Process B,nd Reeli ty, p. 529. (Italics not in the orlginrl).
16 Contra Gentiles, Bk I C. XIII.

..

from the consideration thrt potentiality presupposes Actuality .
But God is the First CRuse.
potentiAl.

He must therefore be in no way

As St. Thomas asserts:
The first being must of necessity be in
pct, and in no wPy in potentiality. For
plthough in any single thing thpt passes
from potentiality to actuplity, the
potentiality is prior in time to the
," ctuB.li ty, nevertheles s pbsolutely speaking, actuality is prior to potentiality;
for whatever is in potentip\ity CR.n be
reduced into Rctuality only by some aeing
in actuality. Now it has already been
proved that God is the First Being. It is
therefore impossible th,!:l.t in God there
should be any potentiality.
17

Since God is Pure Act, He must plso be most perfect, "for
a thing is perfect in proportion to its state of pctuplity,
because we call th/?,t perfect which lp.cks nothing of the mode
of its perfection." 18

Pure Act, then, is pure perfection -

unlimited or infinite reelty.19
The.t God is Altogether immutable follows from the fpet
that He is infinitely perfect.
Everything which is moved p.cquires something by its movement, ~nd Bttains to
wh8t it had not ettained previously. But
since God is infinite, comprehending in
Himself all the plenitude of perfection
of 8.11 being, He c2nnot acquire Anything
new, nor extend Himself to IOmything
whereto He wes not extended previously.
Hence movement in no way belongs to Him.
The real God, then, cl?nnot receive perfection.
17

18
19
20

S~a ~heolo~ica, I q. 3 a.l.
Ibld., I q. . a. 1.
Ibid., I q. 7 a. 1.
Ib id., I q. 9 8. 1.

20

He hps of
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Himself, from all eternity,

~tll

that He C[l,n hl,we.

Nei~her

'can

He be flin process," in the course of which the more perfect
is always produced by the less perfect, for such is a patent
absurdity.

On the contrary, the real God, incompl?,rable per-

fect, abides eternally unchanged.

..

.'

CONCLUSION
EXAMINATION OF

HP~TSHORNE'S COMPP~ISON

AND

EVALUATION OF HIS CONCLUSION
We have seen that the attributes '''''of St.

Thom~,s'

s God

are very different from Dr. Hp"rtshorne' s notion of them.

..

have also seen that the substitute attributes

We

postul~.lted

by

'

Whi tehea,d cannot be applied to a supreme being.

The conclu-

sion that the God of Whitehead is more the supreme being than
is the God of st. Thomas, mp,y now be evaluated.
According to Professor Hartshorne:
It is the unrivalled excellence of the
activity-and-passivity, the unity-andcomplexitY:-the being-and-becoming~es
the joy-and-suffering, of God which
elevates him above e,ll others, ,g,ctue,l
or conceivable.
1
The perfect God "requires his union with the World."
is "the creator-with-the-creatures."
proved,2
God.
ing,"

He'"

But, as we have already

none of these sets of "contraries" can be epplied to

To sum up briefly:

God cannot be both "being-and-becom-

or "activity-and-passivity," for that which is in any

e,spect "becoming" or passive, demp,nds a ca,use.

"Becoming,

receptivity," or "process" necessarily involves the emergence
of 8,n additiona,l element, and the ultimate source of this addition must be a higher cause.

To affirm the contrary is to

assert that being comes from nothing, which is absurd.
1 QQ. Cit., p. 523.
2 . see Pa,rt II, Che,pter II.

Since,
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.'

then, Whitehead's God is "becoming,"
moving, he demands

~

"fluent," passive or

Prime Mover.

God cannot be both lithe unity-and-complexitylt

(as

11

human being is an individual whole constituted by many pa,rts)
becEmse whatever is composite needs

2 ..'7

cause.

"Because every

composite is posterior to its component parts, and is dependent upon them." 3

Whitehead's composite God, then, pre-

•

supposes the existence of a Being, Absolutely Simple, who
ca,uses his diverse element s to unite.
Finally, God cannot "require his union with the World."
Nor can "the relationships of God to the World •
the accidents of his will, a,nd •

lie beyond

be founded -upon the

necessities of the nature of God and the nature of the World. II 4
For e, being who exists and acts merely from the necessity of
his nature presupposes

a Being Who gave him theft nature and

imposed on him the law 8.ccording to which he should act.
The God of Process and Reality, then, who depends upon
other actualities for his complete

realize~tion,

who is not in

all respects infinite, but who is gradually acquiring rep,lization by "process," is in reality rio God at all.
Such a being, even if it were a god, would necessarily be
inferior to the God of St. Thomas.

For "process" or "becoming"

is the ste,te of one who is in potency to a perfection which is
not yet possessed.
3

4

"Everything which moves acquires something

St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, I q.3
Whitehead,Adventures of Ideas, p. 215.

e~. 7.
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- by its movement, and att.9>ins to wha.t it had not attained previously. II 5

But the God of st. Thoma.s possesses trin Himself

.9,11 the plenitude of perfection of all being.
quire anything new."

He cannot e,c-

Since, then, activity is more than

passivity, ~tnd being is more than be<!oming, and possession is
more' than acquiring, the God who is Pure }'\.ct, Pure Being, who
is in full possession of Perfection, is more the supreme being

•

th!3-n is the one who is !lin process" of atta,ining it.

5

St. Thomas Aquine.s, Summa Theologica, I q. 9 a.l.
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